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The Legal Impact on Employers where there is a Sham Element in Contracts 
with their Workers 
 
Abstract 
As a consequence of recent legal decisions particularly, those over the last three 
years an employer that introduces a clause into his contracts (or enters in contractual 
relations with his workers) needs to ensure that the clause or contract is genuine and 
operates in practice as it states that it intends to. Otherwise, as the title of this article 
suggests there might be serious legal implications for an employer.  
The clause (usually a substitution clause) or the type of contract entered into must not 
simply be a device to circumvent the correct application of the law in other words 
perpetrate a sham.1 The recent development of legal rules that can invalidate sham 
clauses or bogus contracts in employment have proven beneficial to workers. In 
particular those workers that want to be treated as employees. As will be seen when a 
court or tribunal has a reasonable suspicion that the clause (or the contract itself) is 
a sham that is designed, for example, to exclude employee status (to those persons 
working under a contract with an employer) they may decide to ignore it and treat the 
contract as a contract of service. The affected worker will then have entitlement to the 
full range of employment rights available to an employee. 2 This article will consider 
relevant legal decisions from all areas of employment law that have a bearing on this 
topic.  They will be analysed fully for the first time. 3
                                       
1 
 
http://dictionary.reference.com usefully defines a sham as: something that is not what it purports to 
be; a spurious imitation; fraud or hoax. 
2 Redrow Homes (Yorkshire) Ltd v Buckborough and anor (2008) UKEAT 0528_07_1010 
 
3 Other commentators writing in this area have tended to restrict their coverage to a specific aspect. 
E.g. Brodie, D Sham contracts and contracting out Employment Law Bulletin (2009), 91 (Jun), 6-8 
 
Introduction 
As already intimated an employer will often enter into a contractual arrangement with 
a worker 4 or introduce a clause (e.g. substitution clause) into his contract simply as a 
device for ensuring that the contract will be treated by an employment tribunal or a 
court as a contract for services. Thereby, avoiding the liability attached to the 
numerous employment rights under statute given to an employee, working under a 
contract of service. It has been a vexed issue for the judiciary to determine if a person 
doing a job of work for an employer is an employee (who is able to benefit from the 
statutory rights afforded to persons with that status by employment law), a worker 
(who has limited protection under statute law) or some other status for example an 
independent contractor (who has extremely limited protection). 5 To assist them in 
differentiating between these three fundamental classifications of person undertaking 
work for a employer the courts in the United Kingdom have set down various tests. 6 
However, in the interests of brevity most of these tests will be excluded from 
consideration in this article and only the development of the test that relates to the 
requirement of personal service will be considered in detail. 7
                                       
4 Ministry of Defence v Kettles APPEAL NO. UKEAT/0308/06/LA also reported at 2007 WL 631655 
 Analysis of this test and 
its impact on the determination of which kind of contract applies will be undertaken . 
Then consideration of how the recent cases involving sham clauses in contracts or 
5 Locatio conductio operarum is a contract where one party agrees to supply the other with a certain 
quantum of labour (contract of service). Locatio conductio operis is a contract where one party agrees, 
in consideration of money payment, to supply the other not with labour but, with the result of labour 
(contract for services). Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law, 311 (1892) 
 
6 H. Collins, ‘Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to Employment 
Protection Laws’ (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 353; S.Fredman, ‘Labour Law in Flux:The 
Changing Composition of the Workforce’ (1997) 26 Industrial Law Journal 337 
7 Express and Echo Publications v Tanton (1999) IRLR 367 
sham contracts have affected this and other areas of employment law will be carried 
out. 8
Traditional Position Regarding Personal Service and Substitution Clauses 
  
The case law in the past has emphasised amongst other things that for there to be a 
valid contract of service a person carrying out the work must be expected to carry out 
at least part or all of the work personally. This issue was first considered over forty 
years ago in a High Court decision in Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v 
Minister of Pensions and National Insurance. 9 Justice MacKenna in that case stated 
that there were three factors necessary to establish if a contract of service applied and 
the first of these was “that the employee agreed to provide his own labour and skill in 
the performance of a service for the employer. “ Accordingly the freedom in a 
contract for an employee to do a job other than by his own hands (e.g. to get another 
to do it) was inconsistent with a contract of service.10 Also in Snook v London and 
West Riding Investments Ltd 11
                                       
8 Freedland, M The Personal Employment Contract (2003) Oxford University Press, Brodie, D Sham 
contracts and contracting out Employment Law Bulletin (2009), 91 (Jun), 6-8 
 (heard in the same year as Ready Mixed Concrete 
case) the Court of Appeal held that for a sham contract or clause to be challenged by 
the courts it would be necessary to establish that both contracting parties had worked 
together to arrange things so that they would deceive a third party. This created 
problems for workers that wanted to challenge their contractual arrangements by 
claiming that a sham clause applied as in most cases they had no knowledge of the 
sham element in the contract and no vested interest in deceiving third parties such as 
 
9 (1968) 2QB 497 
10 Similarly in the Privy Council Appeal of Australian Mutual Provident Society v Chaplin 
and Another (1978) 18 Australian Law Reports 385 Lord Fraser stated that the: ... power of 
unlimited delegation is almost conclusive against the contract being a contract of service.” 
 
11 (1967) 2 QB 786, CA 
the tax authorities. The other factor that means the Snook decision will always 
invalidate any possible claim is that the nature of an employment contract is that the 
contract and its terms and conditions are prepared and presented by an employer 
(usually the party in the stronger economic position) to a prospective employee for 
him only to accept or reject. He would not negotiate his terms with this employer so it 
would be highly unusual for both parties to be responsible for creating sham terms or 
a sham contract as required in Snook.  “The employee is usually either ignorant of the 
deceit or a victim of it.” 12
Fortunately for workers in this position now this decision has been overturned and 
consequently the right to challenge sham clauses in contracts has dramatically 
improved. Before, considering the recent cases that have extended protection to 
workers that have been the victims of sham clauses it is necessary to outline the 
impact of the legal requirement of personal service in a contract of employment. This 
is key to understanding the importance of the legal decisions.  
  
Personal Service 
The requirement that an employee must provide his service personally to his employer 
before a contract of service can apply was set out by the Court of Appeal in Express 
and Echo Publications Ltd v Tanton. 13 Start here This case underlined the earlier 
conclusion 14
                                       
12 Davies A.C.L Sensible thinking about sham transactions (2009) Industrial Law Journal  
 that where a worker did not have to perform work personally and could 
hire a substitute to carry out his work this was one of the factors (albeit a significant 
one) that was inconsistent with a contract of employment and the worker would be 
treated by the courts as self-employed regardless of other factors such as the employer 
Vol. 38 (3) pp 318-329 at p 318 
 
13 (1999) 1RLR 367, CA 
14 Supra 7 
exercising control over his actions at work etc. 15
Evidential Issues 
 In the Tanton case it was held that a 
clause in a driver's contract that provided: “ in the event that the contractor is unable 
or unwilling to perform services personally, he shall arrange at his own expense 
entirely for another suitable person to perform the services” was incompatible with it 
having been a contract of employment. 
It has become apparent that what is said (verbally or in writing) in a contract is 
sometimes misleading or wrong. Despite this the contract is deemed the 
primary source of the terms and conditions of employment irrespective of how 
unfair they might be. So in the general law of contract the behaviour of the 
parties that takes place before or after the contract is formed or during the 
lifetime of the contract has not been deemed relevant to the interpretation of 
the contract. However, through various legal decisions it has become apparent 
that the contract of employment should be treated as an exception to this rule. 
16 For example such behaviour 17
                                       
15 Cassidy v Ministry of Health (1951) 2KB 598 
 can be taken into account when determining 
whether a contractual arrangement or provision is a sham. When the way the 
contract is performed bears no relation to the terms in the agreement it will be 
open to the court or tribunal to go beyond the written text when construing the 
terms of a contract. When as a result of a contractual provision the personal 
service of the worker is not needed in the transaction (and can be carried out 
by a substitute) the courts will look at the genuineness of the right to provide a 
replacement worker. Factors they will consider are: does the employer have an 
16  Carmichael v National Power (2000) I.R.L.R. 43 
17 That is behaviour of the parties subsequent and consequent to the contract being 
finalised or during the currency of the contract. 
unreasonable right of veto over the choice of a substitute 18 or does the worker 
have the authority to choose and pay for the substitute himself. 19
However, when a worker has to undertake work personally this does not 
necessarily mean that he must be an employee. It is often the case that self-
employed individuals who undertake to do work for an employer will agree to 
do the work himself. The absence of a right to provide a substitute may be a 
factor that suggests someone is working under a contract of employment but it 
is certainly not conclusive on its own. 
  
In the past the fact that substitution (allowed under a contract) had not actually 
occurred during the subsistence of a contract was not necessarily deemed 
relevant by the courts. 20
                                       
18 In Tanton the worker had put forward a substitute who was suitable to his employer 
 This was because a worker with a right to 
substitution was entirely free to ignore it and carry out the work himself. 
However, the courts are now more likely to view critically an employer’s 
claim that there is a right of substitution where the substitution of a worker 
does not occur over a long period of time. Disproving the genuineness of a 
claimed right of substitution can be difficult. Employment tribunals are more 
likely to doubt their validity when other terms in the contract are found to be 
false or misleading or a claimed right of substitution does not seem to make 
sense in relation to the contract. An example of the latter situation would be 
where someone is chosen because of his particular skills. For example a 
person who is a; clothes designer, IT expert or person that has a high public 
profile. When there is a limit under the contract on the ability of delegation to 
a substitute given to a worker then this could point to it being a contract of 
19 McFarlane v Glasgow City Council (2001) IRLR 7  
20 Supra 5 
service. This was the case in MacFarlane v Glasgow City Council 21
There are certain tax cases where similar issues have been addressed and what 
follows is an analysis of these cases. 
 where it 
was held by the EAT that a substitution clause limited in its application was 
not necessarily inconsistent with the person who had the ability to substitute 
working under a contract of employment. In the McFarlane case in the event 
he could not personally carry out his work as a gymnastic teacher he had to 
choose his substitute from a list of gymnastic instructors approved and 
provided by the Council. The council could veto the replacement chosen and 
choose the replacement themselves. It was held by the EAT that Mr 
McFarlane was an employee of the Council. 
Sham Contracts and the IR35 Legislation 
IR35 is a term that is used to describe United Kingdom tax legislation which is 
designed to ensure that where there is arrangement in place that purportedly involves 
self employed persons working for an employer it is not in reality disguised 
employment of that person and he is an employee. This law is enforced by the Tax 
Commissioners employed by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).  
However, the findings of HMRC Commissioners on the tax status of an individual 
will not necessarily be binding on an Employment Tribunal, and vice versa. Where it 
is found to be disguised employment the person is taxed at a similar rate to persons 
working under a contract of employment. 22
                                       
21 (2001) 1RLR 7 
 Disguised employees are normally 
workers who receive payment from a client via an intermediary and whose 
22 Busby, N IR35: resolution of a taxing problem? (2002) Industrial Law Journal Vol. 31(2) pp 172–82. 
 
relationship with the client is such that had he been paid directly by him he would 
have been his employee. For example in Synaptek Ltd v Young (Inspector of Taxes) 
23
                                       
23 (2003) All ER (D) 429 
 Mr. Stuchbury had formed his own company, which later became Synaptek Ltd and 
provided computer software services. The company in 1999 entered into a contract 
with an agency to provide software engineering services to EDS, an American 
company whose customer was the Benefits Agency. The question was, under this 
arrangement was Mr Stuchbury a self employed businessman or was he a disguised 
employee of EDS for the purposes of IR35 tax. The Tax Commissioners decided the 
latter situation applied and the case went on appeal and the Commissioners’ decision 
was upheld. There were characteristics reminiscent of a contract of service namely; 
under the terms of the contract, Mr. Stuchbury was allocated the work by EDS and he 
had to abide by all EDS instructions and had to work at least 37.5 hours per week. 
Other factors that were less clear were he: was not entitled to either sick pay or 
holiday pay and his weekly timesheets had to be authorised by EDS and were 
submitted by them to the agency. There was a termination notice period of four weeks 
on either side. Also either EDS or the agency could terminate the contract if the work 
done by Mr. Stuchbury was not to the satisfaction of EDS. Synaptek Ltd had to 
provide its own professional indemnity insurance. The contract was for a fixed period 
of 6 months rather than being related to the completion of a particular project. In 
practice, Mr. Stuchbury decided his own working hours and how the work was done 
although, he reported to a line manager who was an employee of EDS. Synaptek Ltd 
had concurrent contracts with other clients. However, there was a substitution clause 
in the contract which did not give Synaptek Ltd. any right to perform the service to 
EDS by anyone other than Mr Stutchbury. The effect of the contract was that, unless 
and until agreed otherwise the services had to be performed personally by Mr 
Stutchbury. In addressing the question whether that provision pointed to the contract 
being a contract for services rather than a contract of service , the Commissioners 
were entitled to regard it as simply one fact amongst others and in assessing the 
weight to be given to it they should take into account the extent to which the provision 
was utilised in practice. The substitution clause in this case was: “in the interests of 
continuity the Company shall use its best endeavours to procure that the Services are 
provided by the Company Employee personally but may with the consent of the 
Client substitute alternative personnel subject to procuring that such alternative 
personnel are bound by the terms of this agreement.” The right to provide a substitute 
worker was never exercised.  
On appeal to the High Court they found in favour of the Inland Revenue upholding 
the original ruling of the Tax Commissioners that IR35 did apply to the arrangements 
between Mr Stutchbury and his end client, EDS. “The relative weight to be given to 
the various factors … was a matter for the Commissioners. It is not possible, in my 
judgement, to say that they were wrong in the conclusion at which they arrived.” 24
This was a complicated case because of all the different factors pointing to both kinds 
of employment relationship (contract for services or a contract of service) however, it 
does indicate a willingness on the part of the court to look beyond the contractual 
arrangements in weighing up the importance of the factors and not be unduly swayed 
by the contractual documents and make a decision based on the reality of the 
situation.  
 
                                       
24 The Honourable Mr Justice Hart 
In the following case a similar issue arose where a contractor was suspected of being 
a disguised employee of an employer who allegedly was liable to pay tax for them 
under the IR35 legislation. 25 In Dragonfly Consultancy Ltd v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners 26 the case involved a Limited Company Contractor, Mr. Bessell, who 
provided his services as an IT tester through Dragonfly Consultancy Limited. He was 
a director of Dragonfly Ltd and had a 50% shareholding in the company. Dragonfly 
was engaged by an agency, DPP, to provide services to their client the Automobile 
Association (AA) between April 2000 and February 2003 under a series of seven 
fixed term contracts. Dragonfly was served with a notice in 2004 requiring them to 
pay PAYE tax (under IR35) and NI 27
                                       
25 The legislative rules dealing with intermediaries was included in Schedule 12 of the Finance Act 
2000. However, the legislation is now commonly referred to as ‘IR35.  
 for Mr Bessell for the full period in the sum of 
£99,000. Dragonfly appealed to the Special Commissioner against this decision but 
this was rejected. Dragonfly then appealed to the High Court and this was dismissed. 
One of the primary reasons for the dismissal of the appeal was that the contract did 
not reflect the working practices, particularly around the right of substitution. One of 
the contracts had stated that Dragonfly could provide a substitute in place of Mr. 
Bessel with DPP's express written consent (a limited right of substitution). However, 
subsequent contracts allowed the right of substitution and did not refer to DPP's 
written consent being required (an unlimited right of substitution). Also doubt was 
cast on the legitimacy of the substitution clause when evidence was submitted by 
 
26 (2008) S.T.C. (S.C.D.) 430 
27 S.12(c) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 states that where a company fails to pay 
National Insurance Contributions (NIC) in respect of its employees and the failure is due to the fraud or 
neglect of a director or other officer the unpaid NIC may be recovered from that director.  
 
representatives from the AA (the client in this case) that indicated that they would not 
have agreed to accept any substitute turning up in place of Mr. Bessell. These cases 
have highlighted the willingness of the courts to depart from the principle established 
in the Tanton case (regarding the right to substitution) when the circumstances merit 
it. The implications for contractors is still unclear because, the cases are decided on 
the facts in each case and do not necessarily create a precedent. Although the 
contractual relationship of the worker with the contractor can be complicated 
(involving substitution issues and different forms of contracts) the bottom line is, as 
illustrated by these cases, that when sham contractual terms are used by employers the 
courts will be will ignore them and treat these workers as employees for tax purposes.  
Recent Decisions Dealing With Sham Substitution Clauses 
There have been various cases over the last three or four years where the courts 
and tribunals have dealt with the situation where a substitution clause in a 
contract is a sham. In the first two of these where sham clauses were allegedly 
used the EAT and the Court of Appeal followed the precedent of the Court of 
Appeal in Tanton and found in favour of the employer.  In Premier Groundworks 
Ltd v Jozsa 28
                                       
28 Appeal No. UKEAT/0494/08/DM 
 the EAT relied on Tanton in their decision to uphold a substitution 
clause which gave a worker a general right to substitute but, with the proviso that 
adequate notice was given and that the substitute was suitably qualified and 
experienced. The clause stated “ Mr Jozsa shall have the right to delegate 
performance of [ground works] services under this agreement to other persons 
whether or not his employees provided that Premier Groundworks Ltd. is 
notified in advance and provided that any such person is at least capable 
 
experienced and qualified as Mr Jozsa himself.” The EAT held that: “where as 
in this case a party has an unfettered right not to personally perform the 
contractual obligations under contract but can delegate them for any reason  to 
someone else, he cannot be a “worker” as defined in the WTR even though the 
person actually performing the contractual obligations has to meet certain 
conditions. “ The EAT made the point that that if the clause had not been so 
general but only applied in limited circumstances e.g. when the worker was 
unwell 29
In 
 then the EAT might have been less inclined to uphold it.  
Consistent Group Ltd v Kalwak 30 a group of Polish workers had been taken on by 
an agency (Consistent) and contracted out to work for a food processing company. 
The written agreement signed by Consistent and each claimant stated that the claimant 
was not a Consistent employee. It further stated that there was no obligation on 
Consistent to provide work or any obligation on the worker to accept any particular 
work assignment. Where an assignment had been accepted, the claimant had to 
perform the services himself or, if he could not, he had to ensure that the services 
were performed by a suitable substitute. A dispute arose between Consistent and the 
claimants and the claimant commenced proceedings against Consistent alleging that 
he was his employee. The Court of Appeal held that the previous decisions had been 
wrongly made by the ET and EAT. The main criticism levelled by Rimer LJ was that 
the tribunal chairman had failed to provide any reasoning for why the ‘obligations’ 
term was a sham. With respect to the principles involved in the decision the tribunal 
chairman should have been guided by the authorities in particular Snook v. London 
and West Riding Investment Limited 31
                                       
29 Supra 17 
 in determining whether there was a ‘sham.’ 
This ‘required a finding that both parties intended to paint a false picture as to the true 
30 (2009) EWCA Civ 98 
31 Supra 9 
nature of their respective obligations. With respect to the principles relevant to the 
‘sham’ question, The EAT 32 had reasoned as follows: ‘if the reality of the situation is 
that no-one seriously expects that a worker will seek to provide a substitute, or refuse 
the work offered, the fact that the contract expressly provides for these unrealistic 
possibilities will not alter the true nature of the relationship.  It was argued by them 
33that some kind of ‘reality’ test was required to determine the issue. The EAT also 
believed the sham doctrine did not require an intention on both sides to present a false 
impression toothers. However, Rimer LJ in the Court of Appeal disagreed with this 
analysis. He was not convinced by the argument that the substitution clause was a 
sham. He also believed (contrary to the EAT finding) that proof of a sham ‘requires a 
finding that, at the time of the contract, both parties intended it to misrepresent their 
true contractual relationship.’ Accordingly, the court did not uphold their finding that 
the claimant was an employee of Consistent.34
 
 Although these are recent cases that   
very firmly uphold the status quo as regards the courts’ approach to sham clauses 
there are other recent cases that will now be considered in which the judiciary have 
departed from this approach.  
The New Approach 
The tide began to turn in the case of Redrow Homes (Yorkshire) Ltd v Buckborough 
and anor, 35
                                       
32 Elias P 
 when the EAT held that a substitution clause will be deemed a ‘sham’ 
where it is established that neither party to the contract intended for the clause to 
apply in reality. In this case Buckborough was a bricklayer who had entered into a 
33 Ibid 
34 The Court of Appeal in the later case of Protectacoat Firthglow Ltd v Szilagyi in 2009 (see below) 
criticised this decision. 
35 (2008) UKEAT 0528_07_1010 
contract with Redrow. A term of the contract purported to allow Buckborough if he 
wanted, to find someone else to do the work. Buckborough subsequently made a 
claim for holiday pay under the Working Time Regulations. In order to establish his 
right to holiday pay under the Regulations he had to show that he was a worker under 
Reg. 2(1). A worker includes employees and anyone under an obligation to provide 
work or services personally to an employer (but not in the context of operating their 
own business e.g. supplier or customer). Buckborough asserted that his contract fell 
within the latter category and was a contract for personal service.  He argued that the 
right of substitution was a sham as neither Redrow or himself intended that right to be 
exercised. The Employment Tribunal agreed that Buckborough was a worker, holding 
that the term of the contract that allowed the work to be carried out by anyone was a 
sham and Buckborough was expected to carry out the work personally. Redrow 
appealed to the EAT who concluded that the both the end-user and the contractor 
might agree to the inclusion of a contractual term that may be considered a sham not 
only where the parties intend to ‘deceive a third party’ i.e. HMRC or the court but, 
also where the parties simply did not intend for the term to apply. The EAT also held 
that an obligation to ensure work was carried out meant that the contract was one of 
personal service and the person working under it was a worker for the purposes of the 
Working Time Regulations 1998.  In both these cases the judge was willing to look 
beyond the contractual terms and determine the reality of the situation by looking at 
the behaviour of the parties. The reality was the contractual term that allowed others 
to fulfill the task where the worker was unable to do so was a sham. 
This and the other cases cited in this article show that the requirement of personal 
service remains a fundamental factor in a contract of service but, it is not a conclusive 
test in determining the status of a worker. Although personal service will clearly be 
undermined as a suitable determinant of contractual status when sham clauses are 
introduced into contracts by employers to try and put the matter beyond doubt. The 
next case is a useful illustration of the often complex issues involved.  
In the case of Autoclenz ltd v Belcher and Others 36
National Minimum Wage Act 1998
 Autoclenz was a company that 
cleaned cars ready for auction. Valeters, such as Mr Belcher, the lead claimant, were 
provided with all of the necessary cleaning equipment and were paid for piece work. 
They paid their own tax and National Insurance and had signed agreements stating 
that they were self-employed. The self employed  status had been accepted as correct 
by the Inland Revenue earlier in 2004. However, Mr Belcher and others claimed they 
were workers and brought a claim for unpaid wages and holiday pay under the 
 and the Working Time Regulations 1998. 37
Employment Rights Act 1996
 The 
Employment Tribunal that originally heard the claim found that despite the apparent 
self-employed status of the 20 car valeters they were in fact employees of Autoclenz, 
and in any event were at the very least “workers” within the meaning of s 230 of the 
. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) upheld this 
finding in part by agreeing with the tribunal that the valeters were workers, but 
overturned its finding that the valeters were employees. The Court of Appeal 
however, found that the valeters were employees. It also went on to say that the 
existence of a contractual provision allowing for the right of substitution, which is 
never exercised, does not automatically mean that the contractual term is not a 
genuine one. However, given that the valeters were expected to attend work unless 
they gave appropriate prior notice did indicate some degree of mutuality of obligation. 
As a result the right of substitution was not realistically expected to be exercised and 
                                       
36 (2009) All ER (D) 134 
37 SI 1998/1833 
the valeters were employees of Autoclenz. It was recognised that an  employment 
judge would normally take any written terms as accurately reflecting what the parties 
agreed particularly, where there was a signed document confirming acceptance of 
those terms. However, it is often the case that one party will dispute the accuracy of 
these terms because of their failure to reflect the true employment relationship. The 
agreement between Autoclenz and the claimants also contained a substitution clause, 
which was found not to be a genuine aspect of the agreement. The Court of Appeal in 
Autoclenz clarified that where there is a dispute as to the genuineness of a written 
term in a contract the focus of the enquiry must be to discover the actual legal 
obligations of the parties. To achieve this, the tribunal will have to examine all the 
relevant evidence. This naturally includes the written term itself, read in the context of 
the whole agreement, as well as evidence of how the parties conducted themselves in 
practice and their expectations of each other. The case has been appealed to the 
Supreme Court who will hear the case and give their ruling shortly. 38
If there exists a written term permitting substitution, but over the course of the 
contract a particular claimant had never sought to provide such a substitute, it does 
not of itself necessarily mean that the substitution clause is not genuine. Employment 
tribunals must be wary of misconstruing non-exercise of a right, e.g. to substitute, 
with the non-existence of that right. 
 
Both the Redrow and Belcher cases dealt with, among other things, the right of 
substitution which was deemed to be of no effect when the clause implementing it 
was a sham. It is vital that at least one of the contracting parties usually the worker 
                                       
38 The appeal of the decision in Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher (2010) IRLR 70 is listed for hearing in the 
Supreme Court in May 2011 
 
contending that the clause is a sham specifically raises this as an issue before an 
Employment Tribunal. If it fails to do so it is not open to the Employment Tribunal to 
raise the issue themselves. The Court of Appeal held that this was the case in 
Launahurst Limited v Larner.39
Recent authorities have confirmed that where substitution clauses or bogus contracts 
are in use the courts should search for the true intention of the parties and not be 
bound by the strict wording of the contract if this does not reflect the reality of the 
situation. 
 
 
Recent Decisions Dealing With Sham Contracts 
In Ministry of Defence Dental Service v Kettles 40 a job advertisement proved 
instrumental in the decision of an Employment Appeal Tribunal that a female 
worker was working under a contract of service. What is significant is that this 
decision was made by the EAT despite the existence of a written contract (signed 
by her) which clearly stated she was working under a contract for services. 41
                                       
39   APPEAL NO. UKEAT/0188/09/MAA 
 The 
acts were a woman responded to a job advertisement for the post of specialist 
orthodontist consultant. In the advert it stated the job was salaried and involved 
part-time employment in a clinic. She was the successful candidate however, on 
starting the job she was sent a letter which contained documents, one of which 
was described as an “invitation to tender.” Despite her reservations about the 
appropriateness of the contract, which she raised with her supervisor, she signed 
and returned the invitation to tender and was later sent a contract for the 
 
40  APPEAL NO. UKEAT/0308/06/LA also reported at 2007 WL 631655 
41 Middlemiss, S Discriminating Material?  Legal Liability of Employers for Job Advertisements 
International Journal of Discrimination and Law (2007) Vol. 9 pp 95-111 
 
provision of consultant orthodontic services. Under the contract there was a 
substitution clause allowing her to use sub-contractors and although she read the 
clause in the contract she was not in a position to take advantage of it and she 
made this clear to her supervisor. The EAT concluded that: “the nature of the 
job advertisement, which plainly envisaged employment to work personally, the 
express finding of the Tribunal Chairman that Dr Kettle told the MOD she 
would not be able to find replacements, 42 and the express finding of the 
Tribunal Chairman that the MOD found and paid for replacements, are taken 
together a sufficient basis for the Tribunal Chairman's conclusion that she was 
contracted to work personally. He did not err in law in reaching this conclusion. 
“ 43
The question arose whether the Employment Tribunal should have restricted its 
consideration to the contractual documentation in the case or whether it was entitled 
to take account of the job advertisement and the subsequent conduct of the parties.  
They stated their position as follows: “It is true that, throughout the documents, there 
is reference to “contractor” and, in some cases, “independent contractor”, but equally 
the advertisement, which first of all attracted her to this post, is couched completely in 
employment terms.  It mentions salary, a well run clinic, attractive remuneration, job-
share and an Equal Opportunities employer.  It is difficult for the Respondent to 
suggest that this advertisement was in some way unofficial.” 
 
44
The EAT concluded in the Kettle case that despite the content of the contractual 
documents, reference needed to be made to all the circumstances of the case before 
reaching a decision. “Once granted that the Tribunal Chairman was entitled to look 
 
                                       
42 It was found at the tribunal stage that; she could never provide a substitute or a locum orthodontist; 
she never did in practice and would have been unable to do so. 
43 Appeal No. UKEAT/0308/06 Clause 62 
44  Ibid 2007 WL 631655,  Paragraph 19 
outside the four corners of the contract documentation, as I conclude that he was, his 
conclusion that Dr Kettle was an employee of the MOD is not in my judgment 
perverse.  In what can only be described as unusual circumstances the MOD had 
advertised for an employee, interviewed Dr Kettle for the advertised post (clearly a 
contract of service) and told her that she was successful in obtaining that post. Before 
producing after she was employed contractual documents which were irreconcilable 
with the job which had been advertised and it was clearly intended she would do.” 
The EAT were able to attach sufficient importance to the job advertisement and 
subsequent actings of the parties in this case to override the terms of the written 
contract and other documentation which was inconsistent with the reality of the 
contractual situation.  
It is not unheard of that an employer on appointing someone to undertake a specific 
job will between the time of them being selected for the position and starting the job 
change their mind about what the job entails or what kind of contract applies. The 
following decision offers some hope of redress for people in this unfortunate position. 
In Protectacoat Firthglow Ltd v Szilagyi 45
A dispute followed between the claimant and the company about whether or not a 
particular job required scaffolding or could safely be done from ladders. The company 
tried to terminate the arrangement with the partnership and the claimant brought a 
 the claimant Mr Szilagyi had executed two 
documents. One of them was a deed purporting to create a partnership agreement with 
his assistant, Glen Nesbit, giving the partnership business name as M & G Coatings 
which was subject to the Partnership Act 1890. The other was a service agreement 
with the company Protectacoat Firthglow Ltd whereby the partnership undertook to 
provide services to them.  
                                       
45  (2009) WLR (D) 67 
 
claim against the company for unfair dismissal. The company contended that the 
contract was with the firm and accordingly the tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the 
claim. This argument was not accepted by the Employment Tribunal and at a later 
stage the Court of Appeal had to determine whether Mr Szilagyi who had carried out 
the work for the company was their employee within the meaning of section 230 of 
the Employment Rights Act 1996. The Court of Appeal held that if the document 
purporting to retain the services of a person did not represent the true relationship of 
the parties the employment tribunal were entitled to hold that the document had been 
designed to deceive others and a sham and to assume the jurisdiction to determine a 
claim for unfair dismissal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by the company 
and Lord Justice Smith said in this case that in determining the proper legal 
relationship between the parties where there was a contractual document in place that 
would ordinarily be where the answer would be found. However, if either party 
claimed that the document did not represent or describe the true relationship, the court 
or tribunal had to decide what that true relationship was. For this purpose any 
document which could be shown to be a sham designed to deceive others would be 
wholly disregarded by Employment Tribunals in reaching a decision as to what the 
relationship between the parties was. So in a case involving a written contract an 
employment tribunal would ordinarily regard the documents as the starting point and 
ask itself what legal rights and obligations the document created. It might then be 
reasonably asked whether the parties had ever realistically intended or envisaged that 
its terms particularly, the essential terms central to the nature of the relationship (e.g. 
dealing with mutuality of obligation and the obligation of personal performance of the 
work), should be carried out as provided in the written agreement. The following 
quote neatly summarises the outcome of the case: “the claimant was in reality an 
employee even though he had signed agreements purporting to set up a partnership 
between him and an assistant which would deal as an independent contractor with the 
defendant firm. In doing so, Smith LJ, giving the leading judgment, departed from the 
Snook definition of a sham in the employment context 46 and offered a significant 
reinterpretation of the relatively recent Court of Appeal decision in Consistent Group 
v Kalwak... 47 The decision paves the way for a much more worker-protective 
approach to the determination of employee status and is thus to be welcomed.” 48
 
 
Conclusion  
In Protectacoat v Szilagyi 49
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 the Court of Appeal found that where one party was 
relying on the term of a contract and the other was not there was no need to show a 
common intention to mislead.  It is enough that the written term did not represent the 
parties’ intentions or expectations. In such a situation, a tribunal should seek to 
ascertain the actual legal obligations of the parties. In the Kettles case the content of a 
job advertisement and things said by the employer at an interview were more 
persuasive evidence of the type of contractual relationship that should apply than a 
written contract for services (containing a substitution clause) given to the claimant 
after starting her job. So, despite the successes for workers in various decisions 
highlighted in this article (E.g. Dragonfly, Kettle, Szilagyi and the Autoclenz cases) 
the fundamental test derived from the decision in Ready Mixed Concrete over forty 
years ago has not dramatically changed. However, what has changed is the freedom 
given to tribunals and courts to look beyond the contract itself and consider the 
conduct and intentions of the parties to determine what the reality of the situation is. 
This has meant that sham contracts can be challenged.  
47 (2008) IRLR 505 
48 Supra 27 
49 (2009) EWCA Civ. 98 
What can also be concluded is that written contracts are still of vital importance 
however, with the caveat that the contractual terms must reflect the reality of the 
working arrangements and not include sham clauses  or a sham contract.  
With respect to the approach the courts should take to this issue in future the 
following quote highlights that despite an important burden being removed in these 
cases important evidential issues remain for those wanting to be treated as employees. 
“They should not now be deflected from a finding that an individual is an employee 
or a worker by contractual devices such as substitution clauses … However, they still 
face the challenging task of deciding what the ‘true relationship’ is. This will place a 
renewed emphasis on the traditional tests for employee status such as control or 
subordination and dependence or risk allocation. “ 50
There is an increasing tendency for employers to try and avoid the various statutory 
duties associated with the status of an employee (by amongst other things utilising 
sham clauses or contracts) by affixing to them a status where these rights are 
unavailable. This was recognised in a consultation paper prepared the Law Societies 
covering both jurisdictions in the UK in response to the European Commission's 
Green Paper Modernising Labour Law to meet the challenges of the 21st century.  
 
In commenting on the uncertainty in the labour market caused by the complex and 
uncertain issue of employment status it stated that: “In particular, it encourages those 
seeking to avoid employment, and tax, and health and safety obligations, to press 
those in less strong negotiating positions to move to less secure, ostensibly self-
employed, status. This leaves these same individuals with the onus of subsequently 
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proving employment protection before being able to claim attendant employment 
rights. We would suggest, therefore, that this is a key area for legal reform within the 
UK (the same basic rules applying both in Scotland and the rest of the UK). “ 51
The legal development of these cases invalidating sham contracts and the 
comprehensive analysis of them all for the first time might reasonably be identified as 
part of the reform process called for. 
 
 
 
 
                                       
51 Clauses 10 -11 Memorandum by The Law Society of Scotland and The Law Society, Select 
Committee on European Union - Written Evidence, House of Lords, April 2007 www.parliament.uk 
